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Sampsell-Jones: Crawford in Minnesota: The First Five Years

CRAWFORD IN MINNESOTA: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS
Ted Sampsell-Jones1
I. INTRODUCTION

American criminal trials are governed by a variety of rules that protect criminal defendants. Such rules
protect both innocent defendants and guilty defendants. Protection of the latter is a necessary but perhaps
regrettable consequence of protecting the former. Pro-defense legal rules occasionally result in guilty
defendants going free, but that result is said to be warranted because the same rules protect innocents from
wrongful convictions. The tradeoff is justified by the traditional Anglo-American principle, made famous
by Blackstone: "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."2
But it is one thing to accept Blackstone's principle in the abstract and quite another to adhere to it when
facing the concrete and brutal reality of an actual criminal case. It is no easy thing to set a guilty defendant
free. When a legal rule works to free an apparently guilty man, applying that rule fairly is extraordinarily
difficult-and it is no great consolation that in some other hypothetical case, the same rule would protect an
innocent man.
The pressure on judges can be overwhelming. It is no surprise that they occasionally bend the rules to
accommodate accurate determinations of guilt in particular cases. Over time, if the rules are bent enough
times by appellate courts, they eventually either disappear or survive only in a discretionary form,
unconstrained by the rule of law.
Legal rules regarding hearsay and confrontation were until recently trending toward disappearance, or at
least toward liberal admissibility, both in Minnesota and elsewhere.3 Both the rules of evidence and the
Confrontation Clause limit the use of hearsay evidence and protect the right to cross-examination. But
limitations on hearsay have long been criticized by evidence scholars,4 and courts, over time, eroded both
rules.5
1

Ted Sampsell-Jones is an Assistant Professor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law.

2

4 Blackstone, Commentaries 352 (1765).

3

See Kenneth S. Broun et. al, McCormick on Evidence § 327 (6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter McCormick on Evidence];
Ronald J. Allen, A Response to Professor Friedman: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76
Minn. L. Rev. 797, 799-800 (1992); George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 Yale L.J. 575, 708. But see
Roger C. Park, Hearsay, Dead or Alive?, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 647, 658 (1998) (arguing that while "[i]nstitutional forces
may lead to a long-term decline of the hearsay rule," the rule "retains significant influence").

4

John M. Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 741 (1961); John M.
Maguire & Edmund M. Morgan, Looking Forward and Backward at Evidence, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 921-22
(1937); Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 U. Cal. L. Rev. 495 (1987); Jack Weinstein, Probative
Force of Hearsay, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 331 (1961).
5

John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2097, 2105 & n.28 (2000).
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At the level of the Rules, courts expanded certain hearsay exceptions-including the exceptions for excited
utterances, statements for medical diagnosis, and the residual exception-to accommodate more out-of-court
accusations.6 These accommodations were especially common in cases of sex crimes, molestation, and
domestic abuse.7 At the level of the Constitution, courts were enabled by the loose and malleable test of
Ohio v. Roberts to admit un-confronted testimony so long as it was deemed sufficiently reliable. 8 The
combined result was to undermine criminal defendants' right to cross-examine witnesses against them.
The right was revived suddenly and dramatically in 2004 with the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford
v. Washington.9 Led by Justice Scalia, the Crawford Court scrapped the Roberts standard and instituted a
new, more rigid rule protecting the confrontation right.10 Crawford, in design and in effect, restricted the
government's ability to admit out-of-court accusations against criminal defendants.11 It is not hyperbolic to
call Crawford a revolution.12
But a survey of post-Crawford Minnesota cases (presented below) suggests that Minnesota Supreme Court
does not share Justice Scalia's zeal for the confrontation right. Its response to the Crawford revolution has
been unenthusiastic, even intransigent. The same moral and political forces that led Minnesota courts to
bend the hearsay rules in the first place now lead them to bend the Crawford rule.
Minnesota's resistance has already produced substantial conflict between state and federal courts. In the
few years since Crawford, the United States Supreme Court has already overruled two key Minnesota postCrawford rulings.13 The Minnesota Supreme Court responded by finding other grounds to reach the same
result or distinguishing away the holdings of the United States Supreme Court.14 Finally, the simmering
conflict reached a boiling point when one defendant named Orlando Bobadilla, after being rebuffed by
Minnesota state courts, sought federal habeas relief. Federal district Judge Patrick Schiltz ruled that
Minnesota's application of Crawford was not simply wrong, but objectively unreasonable.15
6

See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 3, §§ 272.1, 277-78, 324.

7

See id; Allison C. Goodman, Note, Two Critical Evidentiary Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Closed-Circuit
Testimony by Child Victims and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 855, 876, 882 n.202 (1995).

8

See 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

9

541 U.S. 36 (2004).

10

Id. at 65-69.

11

See George Fisher, Evidence 635-38 (2d ed. 2008)

12

See Josephine Ross, Crawford's Short-Lived Revolution: How Davis v. Washington Reins in Crawford's Reach, 83
N.D. L. Rev. 387, 387-88 (2007).
13

Moua Her v. Minnesota, 129 S.Ct. 929 (2009), vacating State v. Moua Her, 750 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. 2008);
Wright v. Minnesota, 548 U.S. 923 (2006), vacating State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005));
14

See infra Part II.

15

Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (D. Minn. 2008).
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The ruling in Bobadilla's habeas case, if it stands on appeal, could throw Minnesota's post-Crawford
doctrine into disarray. On the other hand, the Minnesota Supreme Court has showed no sign that it will
relent. The conflict between state and federal courts regarding Crawford in Minnesota continues to develop,
and how it will end is anything but clear.

II. THE PRE-CRAWFORD ERA IN MINNESOTA
A. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE

Pointed hearsay questions arise repeatedly in certain types of cases. In domestic violence cases, victims
often report crimes and then subsequently refuse to cooperate with the prosecution, either because they
have reconciled with their abuser or because they fear him, or both. 16 In child molestation cases, victims
are often unable to testify effectively in the formal and frightening courtroom setting. 17 And more generally,
in all cases of sex crimes, victims may be reluctant to relive their painful experiences by testifying at trial.18
Thus, in cases of domestic violence, molestation, and sex crimes, prosecutors often have a particularly
pressing need for hearsay evidence. Such cases also often present the sort of disturbing and highly charged
facts that put pressure on courts to admit inculpatory evidence. It is never easy to free an apparently guilty
defendant, and it is particularly difficult when that defendant committed a heinous and depraved crime,
such as a crime of child molestation. It is thus not surprising that courts have been especially willing to
bend hearsay rules in such cases.
To accommodate hearsay evidence in cases of rape, molestation, and domestic violence, courts in
Minnesota and elsewhere have expanded three hearsay exceptions.
First, courts have expanded the exception for excited utterances. The excited utterances exception admits
hearsay statements made in response to startling events.19 The rationale of the rule it that such spontaneous
outbursts are especially reliable because excitement suspends the declarant's powers of reflection and
fabrication.20 When a declarant is not subjectively upset, or when sufficient time has passed that a declarant
has had time to reflect and fabricate, there is no justification for resorting to the exception.

16

See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 Va. L. Rev. 747, 751 (discussing the need for
hearsay evidence in domestic violence cases).
17

See Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Impact on Domestic Violence and
Child Abuse Cases, 71 Brooklyn L. Rev. 311, 374-80 (discussing the need for hearsay evidence in molestation and
child abuse cases).
18

See Aviva Orenstein, "MY GOD!": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
85 Cal. L. Rev. 159 (1996) (discussing the need for hearsay evidence in rape cases).
19

See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) advisory committee's note; Minn. R. Evid. 803(2) advisory committee's note.

20

Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 8.36 (3d ed. 2003).
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Minnesota courts, however, have expanded the exception to allow statements that lack spontaneity and
statements made long after the startling event.21 Although the exception was intended to cover statements
blurted out in direct response to the triggering event, Minnesota courts have routinely admitted statements
made in response to inquiries, including police inquiries.22 So long as a police officer will take the stand
and testify that the absent declarant was upset when she made the statement, Minnesota courts tend to admit
the statement.
Second, courts have expanded the exception for statements made for medical treatment or diagnosis. Such
statements are deemed especially reliable because the declarant has a powerful motive to speak truthfully
to her doctor. That rationale, however, does not apply to statements of fault.23 As a result, the rule was not
intended to cover statements of fault. As the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules put it, "a patient's
statement that he was struck by an automobile would qualify, but not his statement that the car was driven
through a red light."24
Minnesota courts, however, have expanded the exception to allow statements of fault and identification.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has declined to adopt a categorical rule that statements of fault are always
admissible,25 but it has nonetheless allowed statements of fault in at least some cases.26 It has also indicated
that, in the future, given sufficient foundation, it might adopt a categorical rule of admissibility.27 Even the
current case-by-case approach has substantially broadened the traditional scope of the medical diagnosis
exception.

21

See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 782-83 (Minn. 1986) (admitting statements made an hour after
event); State v. Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1985) (holding that declarant's statement 90 minutes after a
murder was an excited utterance because he was "scared," "shaky," and "very upset."); see also State v. Bauer, 598
N.W.2d 352, 366 (Minn. 1999) ("[T] there are no strict temporal guidelines for admitting an excited utterance . . .
."). But see State v. Martin 614 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 2000) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
rejecting as hearsay a statement made a few hours after a murder, after the declarant saw a story about the murder on
the evening news).
22

See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 2002 Minn. App. LEXIS 258 (admitting statement by victim to police after police
arrived on the scene); Banks v. State, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 429 (same); State v. Kennedy, 1995 Minn. App.
LEXIS 975 (same). Cf. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 20, § 8.36 (noting that admissibility as an excited
utterance should depend in part on "whether the statement was made in response to questions or came from within
as a direct reaction to events or conditions).
23

McCormick on Evidence, supra note 3, § 277 ("In such cases, the statements lack any assurance of reliability
based on the declarant's interest in proper treatment and should properly be excluded.").
24

Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) advisory committee's note.

25

State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 2006).

26

See State v. Salazar 504 N.W.2d 774, 777-778 (Minn. 1993) (affirming the admission of a statement by a fiveyear-old child to a social worker accusing the defendant of sexual abuse); State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 47
(Minn. 1990).
27

Robinson, 718 N.W.2d at 406 ("We do not foreclose the possibility that we might in the future adopt a properly
limited categorical rule of admissibility under the medical exception to hearsay for statements of identification by
victims of domestic violence."); see id. at 406 n.3.

4
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Third, courts have expanded the residual hearsay exception. The exception allows the admission of hearsay
statements not covered by any other exception so long as the statements are necessary and especially
reliable. 28 The exception is controversial and was intended to be applied "very rarely, and only in
exceptional circumstances."29
In Minnesota, however, admissions under the residual exception are anything but rare and exceptional-on
the contrary, they are entirely regular. Minnesota appellate courts have upheld the admission of hearsay
against criminal defendants under the residual exception in many cases and in a wide variety of
circumstances. 30 The Supreme Court has allowed admission in circumstances with virtually no real
guarantees of trustworthiness.31 Minnesota courts also rely heavily on other corroborating evidence to admit
statements under the residual exception 32 even though most evidence law authorities suggest that
corroborating evidence should not be considered, at least in criminal cases.33
In short, Minnesota courts, like many courts around the country, interpreted these three hearsay exceptions
expansively to admit a wide variety of statements, including statements that did not fit comfortably within
the exceptions' stated rationales. The net effect was that the hearsay rules often posed little obstacle to
prosecutors seeking to admit unconfronted accusations against criminal defendants.

28

See Fed. R. Evid. 807 (new rule combining former Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)); Minn. R.
Evid. 807 (new rule combining former Minn. R. Evid 803(24) and Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)).
29

Fed. R. Evid. 803(24), Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, S.R. No. 93-1277; accord United States v. Hughes,
535 F.3d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 2008).
30

See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 725 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn. 2007); State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 410 (Minn.
2006); State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Minn. 1992); State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Minn. 1991);
State v. Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Minn. 1985); State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389, 398 (Minn. 1984); State v.
Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn. 1981); State v. Olisa, 290 N.W.2d 439 (Minn. 1980); State v. Kadel, 2008
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1401; State v. Billingsley, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1236; State v. Lewis, 2008
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 806; In re Welfare of A.B.R., 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1258; State v. Alfaro,
2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 93; State v. Langston, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1291; In re J.M.C., 2006
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1248; State v. Borsgard, 2005 Minn. App. LEXIS 47; State v. Plantin, 682 N.W.2d 653,
659 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Rottelo, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 682; State v. Hollander, 590 N.W.2d 341, 346
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Fettig, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1165; State v. Burg, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 740;
State v. Lonergan, 505 N.W.2d 349, 354-55 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
31

In State v. Muoa Her, 750 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. 2008), for example, the Court upheld the admission of statements
by an alleged domestic abuse victim to her family regarding the abuse. The statements were not spontaneous, they
were made after a substantial lapse of time since the event, they were not under oath, they were not subject to crossexamination, they were not recorded. Cf. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 3, § 324 (listing reliability factors).
The declarant also had a substantial motive to lie-any party in a failing marriage has a strong motive to lie to others
about the relative fault of his or her spouse. Yet the Court held that the statements bore sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness because the statements were based on firsthand knowledge, they were never recanted, and they were
specific. Her, 750 N.W.2d at 276.
32

See Robinson, 718 N.W.2d at 409-10 & n.4 (reaffirming the use of corroborating evidence to support reliability
under the residual exception).
33

See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 3, § 324; Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 20, § 8.81.
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B. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Prior to Crawford, adjudication of Confrontation Clause claims was governed by the Ohio v. Roberts test.34
Under Roberts, Minnesota courts required the prosecution to make a two-part showing: first, that the
declarant was unavailable to testify; and second, that the declarant's statement was reliable. 35 To show
reliability, the prosecution could show either that the statement fell within a "firmly rooted exception" or
that it had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.36
Following the guidance of the United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that both
the excited utterances exception and the medical diagnosis exception were firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions.37 Thus, if the prosecution could successfully admit evidence under one of those exceptions, it
also necessarily satisfied any Confrontation Clause objection (at least as long as the declarant was
unavailable).
The residual exception was not firmly rooted, but the test for the residual exception was substantially the
same as the Roberts reliability test.38 In applying either standard, Minnesota courts would conduct a totality
of the circumstances test to determine whether the statement bore adequate indicia of reliability.39
As with any "totality of the circumstances" test, the result was largely indeterminate. 40 No firm rules
developed for exactly what circumstances should be considered, or how courts should weigh rule when
different factors pointed different directions.41 The malleability of the Roberts test did not always result in
pro-prosecution rulings in Minnesota, but it meant that in any given case, a court could plausibly rule either
way. Ultimately, if a court determined that a statement was sufficiently reliable to merit admissibility under
the residual exception, it could also easily conclude that the statement was sufficiently reliable to merit
admissibility under the Confrontation Clause.
34

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004).

35

See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1981), abrogated by State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn.
2006).
36

State v. Henderson 620 N.W.2d 688, 696-97 (Minn. 2001) (citing Ohio v Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).

37
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 n.8 (1992); see State v. Gates, 615 N.W.2d 331, 336-37 (Minn. 2000) (excited
utterance); State v. Salazar, 504 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. 1993) (medical diagnosis); State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d
777, 785-86 (Minn. 1986) (excited utterance).
38

See, e.g., State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 797-98 (Minn. 2000); State v. Grube, 531 N.W.2d 484, 489-90
(Minn. 1995).

39

Id.

40

See John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to
Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191, 217 ("[A] test for 'reliability' under the Confrontation Clause is
simply too vague to effectively limit any court that otherwise is inclined to admit a hearsay statement under the law
of evidence."); Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause, 71 Brooklyn L. Rev. 401, 403 ("[A]t
least in theory, the testimonial approach makes confrontation analysis more predictable than under the vague
Roberts test examining 'indicia of reliability.'").
41

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (criticizing the malleability of the Roberts test).
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In short, under the Roberts regime, the Confrontation Clause did not impose significant barriers to the
admission of hearsay evidence in criminal prosecutions in Minnesota. Especially in cases involving rape,
molestation, and domestic violence, much hearsay was admitted with relative ease under Minnesota Rules
of Evidence, and once it was admissible under the Rules, it was typically admissible under the Constitution
as well.
II. MINNESOTA’S RESPONSE TO CRAWFORD
Minnesota was not the only state to endorse loose doctrines that allowed broad admissibility of hearsay
against criminal defendants. The changes here were part of a broad national trend. 42 Though not all
jurisdictions went along, many endorsed the same liberal constructions of hearsay exceptions and loose,
almost ad hoc applications of the Roberts test.
It was precisely that trend that formed the backdrop of the Crawford revolution. In a sense, states could no
longer be trusted to protect confrontation rights, so the Supreme Court was forced to intervene with a more
rigid rule. Led by Justice Scalia, Crawford scrapped the messy and malleable Roberts test for something
that was intended to be more clear, more certain, and less amenable to the easy admission of hearsay against
defendants.43
But in the five years since Justice Scalia fired the first salvo in his Confrontation Clause revolution,
Crawford has already encountered substantial resistance. Many lower courts have avoided and evaded
Crawford by construing the definition of "testimonial" relatively narrowly and by creating exceptions to
the Crawford rule. The Minnesota Supreme Court has, for the most part, sided with the counterrevolutionary resistance. The Minnesota Court has issued a variety of rulings that have served to blunt the
impact of Crawford. That resistance has produced an ongoing conflict between Minnesota courts and
federal courts that has yet to be resolved. If anything, it grows more heated with each skirmish.

A. WRIGHT I- AUGUST 2005

The Minnesota Supreme Court's first major attempt to apply Crawford came in State v. Wright.44 Wright
was a domestic violence case with a recanting witness-one of the recurring types of cases where the pressure
to admit hearsay evidence is especially strong. Because the victim refused to cooperate in the state's
prosecution of David Wright, the state sought to admit her statements to the 911 dispatcher and to police.45

42

See Douglass, supra note 5, at 2103 ("Since enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, both the law of
evidence and modern Confrontation Clause doctrine have evolved toward broader admission of hearsay in criminal
cases.").

43

See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.

44

State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005).

45

Id.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court noted-quite correctly-that the Crawford Court had not offered any
comprehensive definition of "testimonial."46 It therefore looked primarily to appellate decisions in sister
states. Rather than adopting any single state's formulation as the best, it essentially combined all of the
factors considered by other courts into a non-exhaustive eight-factor test. 47 The Minnesota Court
emphasized that the ultimate determination was context-specific, to be made on a "case-by-case" basis.48
The Wright Court's approach to Crawford was ironic in a variety of ways. Multi-factor tests are notoriously
indeterminate, and Justice Scalia had criticized the eight- and nine-factor tests that state courts had used to
apply Roberts. 49 The Minnesota Court responded by adopting another eight-factor test. 50 Some of the
factors, moreover, were nothing more than warmed-over reliability factors-the very same factors that were
considered under Roberts. And though one of Justice Scalia's primary criticisms of Roberts was that it was
too malleable, allowing judges to rule either way in many cases,51 Minnesota responded with a no less
malleable case-by-case approach.
In defending its throwback approach, the Minnesota Court noted the Supreme Court's failure to give better
guidance, and suggested that until it received more specific orders, it would maintain the status quo: "We
believe that the task of defining the exact parameters of what constitutes testimonial statements for purposes
of the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution is best suited for the Supreme Court."52 It thus allowed
the admission of both the victim's statements to the 911 dispatcher and her statements to the police against
Wright.53

B. BOBADILLA I- FEBRUARY 2006

Six months after Wright, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced an even more difficult case in State v.
Bobadilla. 54 Orlando Bobadilla's three-year-old nephew reported to his mother that the defendant had
molested him. The mother reported the allegation to police, who in turn arranged a tape-recorded interview

46

Id. at 814.

47

Id. at 812 & n.7.

48

Id. at 812.

49

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 ("Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends heavily on which factors the judge
considers and how much weight he accords each of them.").
50

Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 812-13.

51

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60, 62-64.

52

Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 814.

53

See id. at 815.

54

State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006).
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with a county child-protection worker.55 The accuser was ruled incompetent to testify at trial, so the state
used the tape-recorded interview to obtain a conviction.56 As in Wright, the Bobadilla Court found the
statements nontestimonial and thus admissible. But even setting aside questions about the Wright test, the
result in Bobadilla was problematic.
First, several factors of the eight-factor Wright test seemed to cut strongly in Bobadilla's favor. For example,
it was the police who had initiated the interview, 57 so the third Wright factor should have weighed in
Bobadilla's favor.58 Because the conversation was relatively formal, structured, and conducted pursuant to
specific protocols for investigating abuse, the sixth factor should have weighed in Bobadilla's favor. 59
Finally, the conversation was recorded,60 so the eighth factor should have weighed in Bobadilla's favor.61
The Court responded by modifying the Wright test, and holding that two of the eight factors were the
"central considerations," while the remaining six factors were merely "probative of these two." 62 The
Bobadilla court stated that the two factors had been the central considerations in Wright, but
notwithstanding Bobadilla's vague citation to Wright for that point,63 Wright had said no such thing. In
short, the Bobadilla Court essentially ignored the factors that favored the defendant.64
Second, nearly all other state courts to reach the issue had held that interviews conducted by child-protection
workers were testimonial and thus generally inadmissible under Crawford.65 In response to those cases, the
55

See id. at 246-47.

56

See id. at 248.

57

See id. at 247.

58

See Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 812.

59

Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 247.

60

Id. at 248.

61

See Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 812.

62

Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 250.

63
As support for the proposition that factors two and seven were the central factors in Wright, the Court offered the
following imprecise citation to Wright: "See id. at 811, 813-14." 709 N.W.2d at 250. Neither those passages of the
Wright opinion (nor any other, for that matter) appear to offer any support for that proposition.
64

The next month, however, in a case where the other factors favored the state, the Court revived them. See State v.
Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 515-16 (Minn. 2006).
65

See, e.g., T.P. v. State, 911 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2004); People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th
1396, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Somervell v. State, 883 So. 2d 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); In re
Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Anderson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 119, 125-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005);
State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005); State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 858-60 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); Flores
v. State, 120 P.3d 1170, 1178-79 (Nev. 2005); State v. Mack, 337 Ore. 586, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004).
Most courts since have similarly found that statements made in such circumstances are testimonial under Crawford.
See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th Cir. 2005); Hernandez v. State, 946 So. 2d 1270, 128485 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Hooper, 176 P.3d 911 (Idaho 2007); People v. Rolandis G., 2008 Ill. LEXIS 1440;
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Bobadilla court emphasized that it was applying the same basic test-that it was trying to determine whether
either the child or the interviewer was acting "to a substantial degree" to produce evidence for trial. 66 But
unlike the other state courts, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied that test in a way that allowed admission.
The Court concluded that the interview was not conducted to produce evidence, even though (1) the police
had arranged the interview, (2) the interview was conducted at the law enforcement center with a police
officer present, and (3) the interview was recorded.67
The Bobadilla court departed both from its own prior ruling and also from the body of rulings issuing from
sister states. Bobadilla pushed Minnesota further out on a limb.

C. DAVIS/HAMMON- JUNE 2006

Thus, in Wright and Bobadilla, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a relatively narrow definition of
"testimonial," which served to blunt the impact of the new Crawford rule. While the rulings in Wright and
Bobadilla may have been questionable, they were nonetheless understandable in light of Justice Scalia's
explicit refusal in Crawford to provide a clearer definition of "testimonial hearsay." Arguably, all the
Minnesota Supreme Court had done was answer some questions left entirely open in Crawford.
But after allowing lower courts to develop the law on their own for two years, the United States Supreme
Court eventually re-entered the fray. It took and consolidated the two domestic violence cases of Davis v.
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.68 The former dealt with statements to a 911 dispatcher69 and the latter
with statements to police.70
In Davis, the Court held that statements to a 911 dispatcher are nontestimonial so long as their primary
purpose was to resolve an ongoing emergency.71 In Hammon, by contrast, the Court held that statements
made to police officers at the scene were testimonial.72 The Court suggested that the question in Hammon
State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2007); State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776 (Kan. 2007); State v. Justus, 205
S.W.3d 872, 880 (Mo. 2006); State v. Ortega, 175 P.3d 929, 935-36 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Blue, 717
N.W.2d 558, 564 (N.D. 2006); State v. Siler, 876 N.E.2d 534, 542 (Ohio 2007); In the Interest of S.R., 920 A.2d
1262, 1268 (Pa. Super Ct. 2007); Rangel v. State, 199 S.W.3d 523, 533-36 (Tex. App. 2006); State v. Cannon, 254
S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250, 257-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). But see State v. Arroyo,
935 A.2d 975 (Conn. 2007); State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).
66

See Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 253-54.

67

See id.

68

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).

69

Id. at 817.

70

Id. at 819.

71

Id. at 823-29.

72

Id. at 829-32.
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was not particularly close: "[d]etermining the testimonial or nontestimonial character of the statements that
were the product of the interrogation in Hammon is a much easier task, since they were not much different
from the statements we found to be testimonial in Crawford."73
The ruling in Davis/Hammon appeared to undermine Wright and Bobadilla in several significant ways.
First, in both Wright and Bobadilla, the Minnesota Supreme Court had relied heavily on the Indiana
Supreme Court's decision in Hammon. 74 The Indiana court's decision was then overruled-in an almost
dismissive fashion-by the United States Supreme Court. Second, Davis/Hammon squarely contradicted
Wright's holding that statements made by a domestic violence victim to police at her house were
nontestimonial.75 Third, the Davis/Hammon Court did not engage in any multi-factor test of the sort that
the Minnesota Supreme Court had adopted. Rather, it simply noted that the primary purpose of the
questioning in Davis was to resolve an ongoing emergency, whereas the primary purpose of the
interrogation in Hammon was to investigate a crime.76
Davis/Hammon also undermined Minnesota law in a fourth way that was more subtle, but no less important:
it disavowed the broader characterizations of purpose that Minnesota had accepted in Wright and Bobadilla.
The Indiana Supreme Court had held in Hammon that the officer's primary purpose in interrogating the
victim was not to produce evidence for trial but rather to determine "whether anything requiring police
action had occurred" and to accomplish the "the preliminary tasks of securing and assessing the scene." 77
In Bobadilla, the Minnesota Supreme Court had similarly argued that the child-protection worker's primary
purpose was "assessing whether abuse occurred, and whether steps were therefore needed to protect the
health and welfare of the child."78
In its arguments to the United States Supreme Court, the Indiana Attorney General pressed similar
arguments.79 Justice Scalia, once again writing for the Court, rejected those characterizations.80 Because
the statements "were neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately

73

Id. at 829.

74

The totality of the circumstances approach in the Wright test was derived in part from Hammon. See Wright, 701
N.W.2d at 812 & n.7 (citing Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005)). In Bobadilla, the Court relied heavily
on the Indiana court's reasoning in Hammon. See Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d at 251 n.2 (citing Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at
257-58); Bobadilla at 252 (citing 829 N.E.2d at 257-58; id. at 252 n.4 (citing 829 N.E.2d at 257-58; Bobadilla at
253 (citing 829 N.E.2d at 257-58).

75

See Davis, 547 U.S. at 840.

76

See id. at 827-28, 830-31.

77

Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 458.

78

709 N.W.2d at 255.

79

See Tr. of Oral Arg., 2006 WL 766735 *3-6.

80

547 U.S. at 831.
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to end a threatening situation, the fact that they were given at an alleged crime scene and were 'initial
inquiries' is immaterial."81 He added pointedly: "saying that an emergency exists cannot make it be so."82

D. WRIGHT II- JANUARY 2007

Following his loss in the Minnesota Supreme Court, David Wright petitioned for certiorari.83 In light of
Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the opinion in Wright I and remanded for reconsideration.84
On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not betray any hint that Davis/Hammon fundamentally
altered the framework the court established in Wright I.85 To the contrary, the court stated: "Our analysis in
Wright II comports well with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Davis/Hammon . . . ."86 And in applying the
new (or not new) test, the Minnesota Supreme Court stretched to reach the same ultimate result.
In Davis/Hammon, the Court had emphasized that 911 calls are not categorically admissible, and that a call
that starts out nontestimonial might turn testimonial once "the emergency appears to have ended."87 Part of
the 911 call admitted against Wright was made after he had been arrested, thus after the emergency had
ended. 88 The State on remand conceded that that portion of the 911 call was testimonial and thus
inadmissible.89 Remarkably, the Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with both parties and held that the
entire call was nontestimonial.90 In other words, it adopted an even narrower definition of "testimonial"
than the one proposed by the prosecution.
The Court conceded only what it absolutely had to, namely that the statements made by the victim to police
at the scene were testimonial under Hammon.91 But the court nonetheless refused to order a new trial.
Instead, it remanded the case to the trial court so that the state could have an opportunity to submit evidence
81

Id.

82

Id. at 831.

83

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wright v. Minnesota, 548 U.S. 923 (2006) (No. 05-7551).

84

Wright v. Minnesota, 548 U.S. 923 (2006) (vacating the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Wright and
remanding for reconsideration in light of Davis/Hammon).
85

See State v. Wright, 726 N.W.2d 464 (Minn. 2007) (hereinafter Wright II).

86

Id. at 474.

87

Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.

88

See Wright II, 726 N.W.2d at 474.

89

See id.

90

Id. at 474-75.

91

Id.
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to establish that Wright had waived any Confrontation Clause objection under the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing.92 It did so even though the issue of forfeiture had already been raised, and both parties agreed
that the record was already sufficient to apply the forfeiture doctrine.93

E. WARSANE- JULY 2007

A year after Davis/Hammon was decided, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided yet another case involving
similar facts: State v. Warsame.94 Like the defendants in Davis, Hammon, and Wright, Farah Warsame was
charged with domestic violence crimes. As in Hammon and Wright, the state in Warsame's case admitted
statements made by the accuser after the police arrived at the scene.95 An officer arrived on the scene, and
asked the victim, who had a bump on her head and some bruising on her neck, what had happened.96 Over
the next fifteen to twenty minutes, the victim described the assault.97
As in Davis/Hammon, the officers' questions were aimed at discovering "what happened," not "what was
happening." As in Davis/Hammon, there was no apparent ongoing threat, because Warsame had left the
scene, and the police officers were present with his girlfriend.98 Nonetheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the officer's primary purpose in his interrogation was to assess the girlfriend's medical condition
and to deal with the "ongoing emergency" of Warsame's whereabouts.99
The Court relied on cases from other jurisdictions where the defendant had fled and where there was good
reason to suppose that the defendant posed a significant risk of harm to others,100 though in Warsame's case,
there was no reason to believe such a risk existed. Thus, in Warsame, the Minnesota Supreme Court once
again distinguished United States Supreme Court holdings closely on point and limited their effect.

F. KRASKY- AUGUST 2007

Around the same time, the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with an important case that tested the
92

Id. at 479-82.

93

Wright II, 726 N.W.2d at 480.

94

State v. Warsame, 735 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 2007).

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 688.

99

Warsame, 735 N.W.2d at 693-95.

100

Id. at 694 (citing State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135 (Mo. 2007), and State v. Ayer, 917 A.2d 214 (N.H. 2006)).
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meaning of Davis/Hammon in child molestation cases: State v. Krasky.101 Like Orlando Bobadilla, Edward
Krasky was charged with child molestation, and the primary evidence against him was a videotaped
interview that was arranged by a police officer and conducted by a child protection worker.102 In Krasky,
the interview took place over a year after the alleged molestation, and at the time of the interview, the
defendant was already incarcerated for unrelated reasons.103
After several rounds of litigation, Krasky ended up before the Court of Appeals in the immediate wake of
Davis/Hammon.104 The Court of Appeals noted that Davis/Hammon had implicitly disavowed the eightfactor test of Wright I.105 It recognized the difference in approach:
It has become evident under Crawford and Davis that the Supreme Court has deliberately abandoned a
prior, vague Confrontation Clause test in favor of a new approach that focuses on an uncomplicated study
of the purpose of an interviewer who takes a statement that is later introduced as trial evidence.106
The Court of Appeals thus affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the hearsay evidence.
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and reversed.107 Once again, as in Wright II, the Supreme
Court refused to concede that Davis/Hammon had affected its prior decisions in any significant way. It
concluded, remarkably, "that the Davis decision leaves undisturbed our conclusions in Bobadilla and
Scacchetti."108 It suggested that the holding of Davis/Hammon was "limited to its facts."109
Finally, and most fundamentally, the Krasky Court once again endorsed the dubious (and impenetrable)
factual characterization that the child-protection worker's primary purpose was not to investigate a past
crime but rather to "assess and protect [the accuser's] health and welfare."110 It accepted, in other words, the
same sort of broad and nebulous characterization of purpose that had been accepted by the Indiana Supreme
Court in Hammon and subsequently rejected by the United States Supreme Court.

101

State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 2007).

102

Id. at 639.

103

Id. at 638 & n.1.

104

State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).

105

Id. at 920.

106

Id. at 924.

107

Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636.

108

Id. at 643.

109

Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court observed that the holding of Davis/Hammon was not "an exhaustive
classification of all conceivable statements-or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation,
but rather a resolution of the cases before us and those like them." Id.

110

Id. at 641.
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Put simply, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Krasky reaffirmed that even after Davis/Hammon, not much
had changed.
G. HER- MAY 2008

The rulings in Davis/Hammon, Wright, Bobadilla, and Krasky all centered on the definition of
"testimonial." But those cases also involved tangential discussions of the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing. That doctrine holds that when a defendant procures the unavailability of a witness, he thereby
forfeits any objection to that witness's prior hearsay statements.111 The Minnesota Supreme Court finally
faced that doctrine head-on in State v. Her.112
Traditionally, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine was limited to cases of witness tampering.113 Thus, in
order to use the doctrine, the state had to show that the defendant committed some act with the purpose of
making the witness unavailable.114 In the Roberts era, the forfeiture doctrine did not often matter much
because the Roberts test was malleable to admit a great deal of hearsay without regard to any forfeiture
analysis. 115 Following Crawford, however, interest in forfeiture revived, and several commentators
proposed a broad doctrine to mitigate the effects of Crawford, especially in domestic violence cases.116
Her was a domestic violence murder case. The state admitted the deceased victim's prior hearsay statements
against the defendants. 117 Even though it found that the statements were testimonial, the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed their admission under the forfeiture doctrine.118 It so held even though there was
no showing that the defendant had committed the acts with the purpose of causing the witness's
111

See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 20, § 8.78 (discussing the forfeiture doctrine).

112

State v. Moua Her, 750 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. 2008).

113

See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (recognizing the forfeiture doctrine in a case of witness
tampering).

114

Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 20, § 8.78 ("At the very least, the defendant must intend to make the person
unavailable as a witness . . . .").
115

Cf. James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for "Forfeiture" by Wrongdoing, 14
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1193, 1208-09 (2006) (discussing the relative unimportance of Reynolds prior to
Crawford).
116

See, e.g., Andrew King-Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Panacea for Victimless Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 39 Creighton L. Rev. 441 (2006); Matthew M. Stabb, Child's Play: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Crawford
v. Washington in Child Abuse Prosecution, 108 W. Va. L. Rev. 501 (2005); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford's
Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 34 (2006); Joshua Deahl, Note,
Expanding Forfeiture Without Sacrificing Confrontation After Crawford, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 599, 623-24 (2005);
Jeanine Percival, Note, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases in Light of Crawford v.
Washington, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 213, 248-49 (2005).
117

Her, 750 N.W.2d 258.

118

Id. at 269-75.
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unavailability. In other words, it held that at least in murder cases, the forfeiture doctrine applies where the
effect of a defendant's conduct is to cause unavailability, even if causing unavailability is not the defendant's
purpose.119
The Her decision was strange in several respects. First and foremost, the United States Supreme Court had
already given strong indications that it would reach the opposite conclusion. Months before Her was
decided, the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Giles v. California, which presented the
same issue.120 Oral argument in Giles had been held in April, and based on the tenor of that argument, it
was fairly clear which way the Supreme Court would rule.121 Consistent with those strong indications, the
Giles Court ultimately held that application of the forfeiture doctrine requires a showing of motive or
purpose.122 It subsequently vacated and remanded Her.123 It is unclear why the Minnesota Supreme Court
did not simply wait for the United States Supreme Court to decide Giles rather than issuing a ruling in Her
that was almost sure to be overturned.
Second, the Her court refused to give any issue any clear holding about whether the statements were
testimonial.124 The Court reversed the trial court's determination that the statements were nontestimonial,
but it refused to issue any affirmative holding that the statements were testimonial. 125 In a byzantine
passage, the Court explained:
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the State did not meet its burden to prove that [the victim's]
statement to police was nontestimonial. . . . We, in fact, do not make a determination as to the testimonial
or nontestimonial nature of the statements. We hold only that the State failed to meet its burden to show
that the primary purpose of the interrogation in this case was to address an ongoing emergency. 126
What this passage means is anyone's guess. Can a statement be nontestimonial even where the state fails to
carry its burden of showing that the statement was nontestimonial? Did the Court anticipate that the
forfeiture ruling was likely to be overruled by Giles, and therefore try to leave open another possible basis
for affirming the conviction? Was the Court simply trying to limit the precedential impact of its ruling by
119

Id.at 274 ("[W]e hold that the applicability of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine does not depend in this case
on the State proving that Her murdered [his wife] with the specific intent of preventing her from testifying.").
120

The Court granted cert in Giles on January 11, 2008, see 128 S.Ct. 976, and the case was argued on April 22.

121

See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Analysis: An Old Adage May Not Apply (April 22, 2008) (available at
<http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-an-old-adage-may-not-apply/>) (discussing the Giles oral argument and
the likely outcome).

122

Giles v. California,128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008). The Her case was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court and was
remanded the Supreme Court of Minnesota in light of Giles. See Moua Her v. Minnesota, 129 S.Ct. 929 (2009),
vacating State v. Moua Her, 750 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. 2008).

123

See Moua Her v. Minnesota, 129 S.Ct. 929 (2009), vacating State v. Moua Her, 750 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. 2008).

124

Her, 750 N.W.2d at 269.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 269.
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framing it in procedural terms?
The meaning of the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding regarding the nature of the statements is unclear.
But in any event, the Minnesota Supreme Court's key holding on forfeiture was very short-lived, and Her
stands as a strange and somewhat embarrassing chapter in the story of the Minnesota Supreme Court's
response to Crawford.

H. BOBADILLA II- JULY 2008

Despite the decision in Giles, Minnesota's post-Crawford jurisprudence remained largely unscathed as of
mid-summer 2008. In their effect if not their intent, the post-Crawford rulings of the Minnesota Supreme
Court had succeeded in limiting the effect of Justice Scalia's revolution. In general, when faced with
questions unresolved by the United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota Court generally resolved those
questions in a way that retained the status quo, and in a way that favored the prosecution.127 When it faced
issues that very similar to the issues faced in Crawford and Davis/Hammon, the Minnesota Court used small
factual differences to justify contrary results. And even when explicitly overruled by the United States
Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court left open the possibility of reaching the same result by other
means.128
In short, for several years after Crawford, the Minnesota Supreme Court succeeded in reaching the very
same results that it had reached before Crawford-it continued to maintain broad doctrines allowing the
admission of hearsay against criminal defendants. It resisted the revolution, and it resisted federal
interference. But as the revolution advanced at the federal level, and Minnesota resisted at the state level,
the possibility of a more direct conflict between the state and federal courts grew. That possibility was
realized when Orlando Bobadilla sought federal habeas relief.129
Especially since 1996, when Congress passed AEDPA,130 defendants seeking habeas relief face very long
127

The most notable exception was State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006), in which the Court held that
BCA lab reports are testimonial. That decision was largely procedural, however, and is unlikely to affect the
outcome in many cases.
128

See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text (discussing Wright II).

Her's overruling may likewise have little long-term effect on Minnesota law. The Minnesota Supreme Court could
easily reach the same result in Moua Her's case by replacing the murder exception with a domestic violence
exception. It could also maintain a broad forfeiture doctrine, Giles notwithstanding, by adopting the same sort of
loose mixed motive analysis that it has used to define "testimonial." People have myriad motives for their actions.
Just as it is easy to say that a child-protection worker's primary purpose is to assess a child's well-being (rather than
to investigate what happened), it would be easy to say that a substantial part of Moua Her's motive was to prevent
his wife from going to authorities.
129

Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Minn. 2008).

130

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). AEDPA, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, was passed in 1996 in the
wake of the Oklahoma City bombings. It included a wide variety of provisions, including a deferential standard of
review for federal courts reviewing state criminal convictions.
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odds. AEDPA mandates a highly deferential posture of review, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly
insisted that federal courts accord that deference to their state court counterparts.131 Orlando Bobadilla's
odds were made somewhat longer, perhaps, by the fact that he drew District Judge Schiltz, a conservative
judge not usually known for his sympathy to criminal defendants. On the other hand, Judge Schiltz clerked
for Justice Scalia, and perhaps he (unlike the Minnesota Supreme Court) shares Justice Scalia's enthusiasm
for the constitutional value of confrontation.132
In July of 2008, Judge Schiltz granted Bobadilla's habeas petition.133 In so doing, he sharply criticized the
Minnesota Supreme Court's handling of the case.134 Judge Schiltz found, in essence, that the Minnesota
Supreme Court had ignored the overwhelming evidence in the record that the purpose of the childprotection worker's interview was to investigate a crime.135 He found that the Court had largely invented its
characterization that the purpose was to "assess the health and welfare of the child."136
[T]his Court holds that it was objectively unreasonable for the Minnesota Supreme Court to conclude that
a recorded interview of a child that was conducted at the request of a police detective, in that detective's
presence, at a law-enforcement center, by a government actor specially trained in the forensic interviewing
of children, pursuant to a statutory scheme requiring the police and the social-welfare agency to combine
their investigatory efforts, that took place five days after the event that was being investigated, when the
child was clearly not in any immediate danger, and that involved using highly structured questioning to
elicit a statement inculpating a suspect, was not a "police interrogation" within the meaning of Crawford.137
Judge Schiltz thus found that Minnesota Supreme Court's decision involved both an unreasonable
determination of the facts and also an unreasonable application of law. 138 He thus granted Orlando
Bobadilla a new trial.139
III. CONCLUSION

The future of Crawford in Minnesota is uncertain. The state has appealed Judge Schiltz's order in Bobadilla,
and given the Eighth Circuit's record on habeas rulings, the state has a good chance of succeeding. If the
131

See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

132

See Schiltz entry at the Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf.hisj.

133

Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.

134

Id. at 1112.

135

Id. at 1112-13.

136

Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.

137

Id. at 1112.

138

Id. at 1112 n.10.

139

Id. at 1113.
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state succeeds in its appeal, it will likely leave the Minnesota Supreme Court free to continue on the path it
has followed for the past five years-and Crawford will have only a limited effect in Minnesota.
On the other hand, if the Eighth Circuit upholds Judge Schiltz's order, Minnesota's post-Crawford
jurisprudence will be thrown into a tumult. If Orlando Bobadilla is entitled to habeas relief, then Edward
Krasky, Farah Warsame, and many others might also be entitled to habeas relief. If the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision in Bobadilla was clearly wrong under Crawford itself, then the Court's post-Davis rulings
are even more dubious.
Most fundamentally, if the Minnesota Supreme Court's post-Crawford jurisprudence is not just wrong but
objectively unreasonable under federal law, the Minnesota Court will be forced to relent and reform its own
jurisprudence. If it fails to do so, it may face a long and potentially bitter battle with the federal courts.
But at the same time, the future of Crawford itself is uncertain at the federal level. Justice Scalia's decision
in Crawford garnered strong support. 140 Since then, however, both Justices Thomas and Alito have
indicated their discomfort with the Justice Scalia's approach, and they have argued for a far narrower
definition of "testimonial."141 The Court splintered further in Giles, where three justices (Kennedy, Stevens,
and Breyer) argued for a broader forfeiture exception to Crawford, and two others (Ginsburg and Souter)
appeared to endorse a nearly categorical domestic violence exception.142 Justice Scalia's Crawford coalition
is already showing signs of strain.
In the end, the moral and political pressures on judges may prove overwhelming. The same concerns that
led Minnesota courts to freely admit hearsay in the Roberts era now lead the Minnesota courts to resist
Crawford, and those same concerns may well lead Justice Scalia's colleagues to abandon his revolution.
Asking judges to free apparently guilty men in the name of an arcane procedural right may be asking too
much. And as the Minnesota Supreme Court has ably demonstrated over the last five years, even ostensibly
rigid constitutional rules are always flexible enough to accommodate a substantial amount of evasion.

140

See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 37 (2004) (Six Justices joined Scalia and two concurred in the judgment).

141

See Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring); Davis, 547 U.S. at 834-42 (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
142

See Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2694-95 (Souter, J., concurring in part); Id. at 2695-2709 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

19
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

19

